Barbour v. Haley

Alabama is the only state in the country with a significant death row population that has no state-funded mechanism to timely provide legal counsel to condemned inmates.

Under Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, a condemned inmate has only one year from the conclusion of direct appeal to investigate, prepare, and submit a petition for post-conviction review. Because legal counsel is almost never appointed prior to that one-year deadline, most inmates are forced to spend nearly all of that time searching for counsel and eventually may have no choice but to submit pro se petitions.

Rule 32's complex procedural requirements – coupled with the State’s aggressiveness in pursuing dismissals for failure to comply perfectly with those requirements – lead to almost certain summary dismissal of death row prisoners’ claims.

In Barbour v. Haley, a class of condemned prisoners who were unable to afford counsel and had not been appointed counsel prior to the deadline for filing their state post-conviction petitions filed a § 1983 suit against the State of Alabama in December 2001.

The complaint alleged that the failure to provide timely legal assistance in post-conviction capital cases violates the plaintiffs’ rights to counsel and to access to the courts. Plaintiffs asked the federal district court to order the State to alter the system to provide the constitutionally-required access.

Chief Magistrate Judge Coody of the Middle District of Alabama issued a memorandum opinion on January 23, 2006, denying relief. Barbour v. Haley, No. 2:01CV1530-C, 2006 WL 173652 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 23, 2006). Plaintiffs appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. That court issued an opinion on December 8, 2006, in which it affirmed the district court’s decision. Barbour v. Haley, No. 06-10920 (11th Cir. Dec. 8, 2006).

In its opinion, the court “recognize[d] the logic in the argument that there simply are not enough volunteer lawyers willing to undertake a full review and investigation of a case in order to initiate postconviction proceedings on behalf of a death-sentenced inmate. If we lived in a perfect world, which we do not, we would like to see the inmates obtain the relief they seek in this case.”

However, the Eleventh Circuit ultimately held that it was constrained not to order the relief sought by Plaintiffs. Specifically, the court concluded that Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989) (plurality opinion), “established a categorical rule that there is no federal constitutional right to postconviction counsel.” Barbour, slip op. at 15.

The challenge to Alabama’s refusal to appoint post-conviction counsel in death penalty cases was taken to the United States Supreme Court, which denied review.